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Abstract
Thomas Aquinas, like many other, but by no means all medieval the-
ologians and philosophers, espoused a theory of truth by identity. Truth
exists primarily in the mind, but insofar as it realises the truth of
things, truth exists in things also. Both truth and meaning are inher-
ent to form, which shines forth in things to render them as things, or
as exemplars of universal essences. In the event and act of knowledge,
form as species migrates from things into one’s mind by a process in-
volving at once passive stamping, active abstraction, and imaginative
mediation. To know in this manner is to manifest, and express fur-
ther the truth of things which is intrinsic to their very being. It is not
merely to think logically or coherently, or to judge correctly as to ev-
idence, though these things are certainly involved. Nor is it to ‘repre-
sent’ in a detached fashion a supposedly objective reality that is in itself
alien to meaning or truthfulness.
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Such a theory of truth as the realisation of a teleological identity that is
inherently supposed to exist between things and mind can be contrasted
with modern accounts of truth which regard it either as mirroring repre-
sentation, as warranted experimental assertion, as logical coherence or
as an ultimately redundant registration of the way things are, rendering
the word ‘truth’ but another way to articulate ‘being’ or ‘existence’.
For most modern thinkers, and even for many Thomists, includ-
ing the late Herbert McCabe of the Oxford Dominicans, Aquinas’s
account of truth in terms of species can seem to belong to an out-
moded and exotic mode of metaphysics. It is often tacitly assumed
that such metaphysics were rightly refused in the early modern period,
however critical one may claim to be of Bacon, Descartes and Locke.
Even strong critics of modern epistemological theories of truth, such as
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2 Truth as Conformation in Herbert of Cherbury
Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor, are chary of espousing a full-blown
theory of truth as identity. They prefer to characterise pre-modern
notions of truth as theories of truth by ‘contact’, and modern, repre-
sentational ones as theories of truth by ‘mediation’. Yet to some ex-
tent, this terminology, however accurate in many ways, rather glosses
over the mediating role played by form as species and ignores the
point that knowledge as entirely unmediated contact is another mode
of modern thinking about truth, as articulated by Thomas Reid, though
found already in the Middle Ages with the Franciscan Peter John Olivi.
Equally, the modern mode of the theory of knowledge by contact rec-
ommended by Dreyfus and Taylor, namely in terms of one’s bodily
immersion in the world, does not really allow for the inherent mean-
ingfulness of things, in the way that Aquinas did, and so is not better
protected against the possibility of subjective relativism than are theo-
ries of truth as representation.
It is better perhaps to talk of pre-modern approaches to truth in terms
of identity and not of contact alone. But are not all such approaches
today now unthinkable? There can be two reasons for supposing
otherwise.
First, it can be argued that modern theories of truth are scarcely the-
ories of truth at all. If truth merely asserts, in whatever manner, ‘what
is the case’ with being, then the word ‘truth’ is truly redundant. And if
indeed the mind can ‘correspond’ to being, then how does one know
that such ‘correlation’ is accurate, and how does one understand it to
be possible? As Quentin Meillassoux has argued, modern philosophy
since Kant cannot really answer the latter question. If, on the other
hand, ‘truth’ relates to coherence, then why is anything that is merely
consistent within its own terms necessarily ‘true’ in any wider context?
Finally, if only changeable and contingent things are true, as tends to
be the case for modern theories, then are they not just ‘true’ in a merely
trivial sense?
By contrast, for there really to be truth, three things are requisite.
First, there must be an inherent connection between objects and sub-
jects, between things and spirits, between things known and knowing
minds. Truth must, in some sense, be supposed to be there. It must
be analogical, really relational, horizontally participatory, and teleo-
logical. To know must be an event in the life of that which is known,
bringing it to fruition.
Secondly, the intrinsic order between thing and mind, object and sub-
ject, cannot be exhausted as contingent, subject to endless change and
ultimate dissolution. It must somehow reflect the eternal and partici-
pate in it.
But it is not enough that truth should be eternal, and that participation
in this truth should engender an order of conformation between reality
and spirit. If this conformation participates in the eternal, the eternal
cannot be a matter of ineffable being. It must, to use Plato’s term, be
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dynamis. It must, in the third place be one with self-expression, and
one perforce does not know of any existence which does not manifest
itself. Phenomenology may not exhaust ontology, but there cannot be
an ontology without phenomenology. To be is to show, and to express
oneself, and so potentially to relate oneself to a third factor. If the finite
conformation of object and subject participates in the eternal, or con-
forms to it, then one must conceive the eternal, or the infinite, as itself
an eternal correlation between being and its expression or manifesta-
tion. This expression is eternal truth, a circumstance which Aquinas of
course understood in Trinitarian terms.
With these three requisites, one has an ontological account of truth,
but also an ontology or metaphysics in which truth plays a central role.
Without these three, one is confined to a nihilistic ontology without
truth, or to a theory of truth as epistemological, of whichever kind,
which is not to acknowledge truth’s reality.
So if truth by identity is today inconceivable, then one can argue that
really one is saying farewell to truth as such. But is such a position
inconceivable?
A second point is that even the early modern verdict was not as uni-
form as has sometimes been supposed. It is rather that later thought has
tended to build upon those thinkers who rejected knowledge by iden-
tity. But certain other thinkers not only defended it, but also elaborated
it in new ways which one might now think of as ‘alternatively modern’.
It is these efforts with which I am concerned in this lecture.
Edward Herbert, Robert Greville, and Anne Conway are writers who
belong to what the philosopher J. H. Muirhead argued was the major-
ity report of Anglo-American philosophy, and not that of empiricism:
a current which he described as ‘Platonic’ and ‘idealist’, but which
one might today more accurately describe as, in its original inception,
‘Platonic-Hermeticist’, with a continuing admixture of Scholasticism.1
The rival current to this philosophy in England was Baconianism, but
this was perhaps more ethically pragmatic than primarily empiricist.
Moreover, Baconianism could itself be ‘Platonic’, and the ‘Platonists’
included Baconian elements of modern interest in observation, experi-
ment, conjecture, and technology.
This philosophical current was by no means unique to England.
Its presence was perhaps particularly marked, however, because of
the politically enforced circumstances of the English Reformation,
and the unease of many English intellectuals with the extremes of
Protestant doctrine and its doctrinal arguments.2 At the same time,
1 J.H. Muirhead, The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy: Studies in the His-
tory of Idealism in England and America [1931] (London: Routledge, 2018). My thanks to
Father Dominic White for inviting me to deliver the Annual Aquinas Lecture at Blackfriars
Cambridge, in 2020.
2 The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century, P. R. Anstey
ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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unease with Catholic authoritarianism was increased by the Counter-
Reformation. For these reasons, these thinkers can be seen as sustaining
currents of Renaissance theology, which had itself sought out a differ-
ent kind of ecclesial reform. The rational quest for truth had been at the
centre of this seeking, though it had not conceived reason in separation
from faith, nor from grace. In continuity with the Fathers, and with
Aquinas, this current problematised, against contemporary scholasti-
cism and contemporary Protestantism, a duality of nature and grace.
At its core, as for John Colet,3 lay a revived interest in Plato, whose
corpus was by this time available, together with an appreciation of the
Neoplatonic writings and associated but more enigmatic texts of the
Chaldean Oracles and the Hermetic corpus. These concerns, however,
were not seen as ‘Neo-pagan’ in character, as they were regarded as
continuing the integrating approaches of the Church Fathers.
But this integration was taken further in two respects. First, the Aris-
totelean separation of physics from metaphysics tended to be regarded
with Neoplatonic suspicion. Cosmology was united with metaphysics,
and it is notable that this is one source of the ‘scientific revolution’
which contrasts with later, if dialectically continuous, tendencies of a
mechanical physics to ‘physicalise’ the metaphysical.4 Secondly, the
increased ethical concerns of humanism for reform and improvement
encouraged a Platonic-Hermetic concern with ‘natural magic’ which
was thought to improve people’s lives, and even physical reality. This
was undertaken in a prayerful spirit which was an extension of a theur-
gic approach to liturgy which had already entered Christianity from
Neoplatonism, through Dionysius the Areopagite, who was a central
point of reference for Marsilio Ficino – incidentally a great respecter
of Aquinas – and others.5
This current of thought, as we see in the case of the English thinkers,
was imbued with scholastic categories, though it tended to be criti-
cal of the ‘Schools’, by which it referred to late medieval and early
modern manifestations of scholasticism. But to this sustained scholas-
ticism was brought a distinctively modern awareness of the need to
apply Aristotelian categories with caution, and in an heuristic manner,
to the perplexing variety of things, and of the receding inexhaustibil-
ity of their observation, given the complexity, infinite divisibility and
expand-ibility of reality. The mutability of things, and of the human ca-
pacity to modify things, led to an increased awareness of the realm of
3 See Antoine Faivre, Western Esotericism: A Concise History, trans. Christine Rhone
(New York: State University of New York Press, 2010).
4 See Brian P. Copenhaver, Magic in Western Culture: From Antiquity to Enlightenment
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
5 ‘The goodness of a thing lies in its eternal character [signatum]’: Herbert, De Ver-
itate, 191. One might substitute ‘signature’ for ‘character’ [signatum]. On this aspect of
Herbert, see Giorgio Agamben, The Signature of All Things; On Method, trans. Luca
di I’Isanto and Kevin Attell (New York: Zone, 2009), 65.
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the artificial, and of the power of artifice – including an interest in the
ways by which the natural and the artificial, and the physical and the
mental, might interact. This interaction at times seemed to be ‘magical’
in character, as likewise, the human capacity for conjecture.
In the cases of Herbert, at the beginning of the English seventeenth
century, of Greville, in its middle part, and of Conway, at its ending, it
is no accident that these were titled nobility. For they reflect a lay, court,
and aristocratic unease with clerically-generated squabbling which had
encouraged unprecedentedly terrible civil and international wars. Their
distinctive interest in truth and in reason was born of a concern with
peace and mediation. One would be mistaken, however, if one were
to read their work as ‘proto-enlightenment’, unless one were to take
into account the at times ‘esoteric’ character of the Enlightenment it-
self. These thinkers were concerned to think through truth in wholly
religious terms, and to propose faith and grace as part of the integral
concern of reason.
1.1 Herbert’s Theory of Conformation
This evening there will only be time to consider the thought of Herbert
of Cherbury who possessed the most fully thought through updated
version of a theory of knowledge by identity.
Specifically modern as it is in certain ways, the theory of confor-
mation in the writings of Edward Herbert is not put forward as an
epistemological theory, nor as a theory of representation. Indeed, one
could hazard that it possesses features which anticipate postmodern cri-
tique, though it is necessarily rooted in a pre-modern and Renaissance
sensibility.
In De Veritate, Herbert is not arguing that the mind must ‘conform’
to things in their given evidence, and be merely constrained by this. Nor
is he saying that the evidence which one receives through one’s senses
must be ‘conformed’ to the way in which one’s mind works, or to its
a priori categories of understanding. Rather, by conformation he is re-
ferring to a phenomenon of the Platonic metaxu, or of what William
Desmond calls ‘the between’. Truthful understanding is possible be-
cause there is a natural relation, analogy or harmony between things
and mind, a kind of occult or sympathetic echo or affinity. One’s under-
standing is an instance of the general analogy which pertains between
one thing and another, of their inherent connectedness which cannot
be understood in terms of mechanism, but rather of secret ‘affinities’,
‘emanations’, foreshadowings, and the construals of the ‘signature’ of
one thing by another.6
6 De Veritate, 75-114.
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The inclusion of knowing as conformation within a wider meta-
physics of analogy is confirmed by Herbert’s central and seemingly
strange doctrine of the indefinite number of faculties.7 Such faculties
had otherwise been considered to be restricted in number, and were
construed in terms of one’s general mental powers to sense and to un-
derstand. In such terms, the five senses constituted five different fac-
ulties of sensing; similarly, the will, the power to reason, the power to
judge, the imagination and the memory, were often taken to be faculties
or capacities to understand. The Platonic-Hermetic current of thought
often criticised this ‘scholasticism’, as when Cudworth mocked the
idea that the lute is played by the musical faculty, rather than by a
musician.8 Similarly, he says, it is not the will that wills, nor the rea-
son that thinks, but a man that does both. Here he implies a unity and
integration of the faculties, while specifically allowing that the soul is
composed of varying capacities.
It might appear that Herbert had already entertained the opposite po-
sition. In an almost ‘postmodern’ fashion, he favoured plurality and dif-
ference. There are not only five senses, he says, sounding somewhat an-
ticipatory of Gilles Deleuze: there are as many senses as things sensed;
as many ways to smell as there are perfumes, and as many hybridis-
ations of the five senses as coincide with one’s manifold synaesthesic
experiences. Likewise, there is not a limited number of general truths:
there are as many truths as there are things, and the number of things is
infinite. The diversification of truths, according to Herbert, diversifies
and transforms the knower, in such a way that every time a new knowl-
edge arises, it is known by a newly emergent faculty, tailor-made for
this task and no other. A postmodern delirium and fragmentation of the
unified self appears to beckon.
In the face of such a diversification, many thinkers of the age were
fascinated but aghast. John Locke later responded that many different
things can be known or done by a single power; one does not need
to diversify the power itself.9 This seems to make good sense, until
one realises that Herbert does not mean, by ‘faculty’, a pre-given, a
priori mental capacity. As the Aristotelianising Nathaniel Culverwell
discerned, he rather means an arising facility.10 That is to say, the fac-
ulty to know a wasp is not present, is not shaped, until a wasp comes
7 De Veritate, 227.
8 Ralph Cudworth, A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, with a Trea-
tise on Freewill (1731) Sarah Hutton ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
170-1
9 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1979), II, xix, §§ 16-20, pp. 242-244; Bedford, The Defence of Truth, 78-80.
10 Nathaniel Culverwell, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature (Indi-
anapolis: Liberty fund, 2001), 93-96, 160.
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buzzing within one’s purview, or perhaps until one has been stung by
one.
This notion of an arising facility is an extension, as Herbert indicates,
of the Aristotelian and scholastic theory of knowledge as occurring by
transfer of form, or of species, from materialised form in the thing, to
a form that is spiritualised in the mind. One has the power or faculty to
know a wasp because one’s mind literally becomes to a degree wasp-
like in its inner configuration. But Herbert developed this doctrine in
two ways. First, he had recourse to a somewhat Platonic construal of
the active and creative capacity of the mind: a new faculty arises when-
ever one sees an animal, an insect or a wasp, because one is to a degree
rehearsing its creation, or its coming to be. Thomistic actualisation of
the form can indeed be seen as a subjective bringing about of a thing
within one’s mental universe. Secondly, notions of species are, for Her-
bert’s theory, diversified. It is not just that one becomes spiritually ani-
mal or insect-like, but that one becomes specifically wasp-like, or even
this wasp-like. For the Aristotelian and Thomistic legacy, knowledge
was primarily of universals; now, for Herbert, knowledge is of intuited
particulars. One cannot subsume the wasp, nor any one of the num-
ber of rare curative flowers which Herbert mentions, such as elecam-
pane and euphorbia,11 under a general faculty for knowing things, nor
even for knowing animated things. Rather, to know a wasp modifies
the nature of one’s knowing. Now one can know a wasp; one could not
have known a wasp before. Now one’s knowing is a waspish kind of
knowing, as it becomes now earth-like, water-like, kingfisher-like or
pike-like, and so forth.
This contagious diversification, as it were, implies that knowledge is
a work of occult fusion, an instance of the natural magic which Her-
bert’s De Veritate acknowledges to be at work in all things and in all
places. Material evidence does not constrain thought; thought does not
draw in, and constrain this evidence into its own mould. And no mo-
ment of imaging ‘representation’ takes place in either direction. Rather,
thought arises, as it were, as a silent electrical explosion of the meeting
of the nonetheless incommensurate forces of matter and spirit, body
and mind, in their imponderable fusion. In this fusion, an event occurs,
from which something new arises. It is altogether new, but in continu-
ity with everything, both material and spiritual, which has gone before,
and is expressive of a secret affinity which was always latent or secretly
promised. For if the wasp flies in such a way that it may be known, then
its flying and existence always contains a kind of proto-understanding.
The implications of Herbert’s position are both vitalist and somewhat
11 ‘[T]hat plastic power which reduces different kinds of food to one form […] Thus the
pike, the cat and the human being will each form their limbs in the same manner as does a
gudgeon, and according to the knowledge proper to their species, direct the food to the proper
points’. De Veritate, 169.
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pan-psychic. One might also say that, for the mind to develop the
faculty of knowing, the wasp shows a certain sustaining of corporeal
definition within the mental realm. This is a point later insisted upon
by Conway. Herbert’s ontological vision, therefore, is non-dualist in
character.
Knowledge, for Herbert, is an occurrence: a further weaving together
of the density of the real with the luminosity of spirit, in the event
of their fusion. It follows from this, as later for Robert Greville, that
there is little distinction between intelligence and truth. Intelligence
is a further fullness of that ‘dynamic’ manifestatory power which is
intrinsic to things as things. When intelligence is operating as it should,
it simply is the truth. There is no ‘non-psychological’ truth, unless it is
in an ontological realm of Intellect lying above that of Soul, as for
Neoplatonism.
Truth, for Herbert, is not a matter of evidence, of logic, or of rational
discourse. It is rather immediate and intuitive. This does not, however,
mean that it is merely diverse or heterogeneous in a nominalist fash-
ion. For Herbert does not say that there is only an arising faculty for
each particular; he also says that there is an arising faculty for each
universal reality, and that these are equally real and equally apparent.
A faculty for wasps, and another one for their flight, and another one
for their flight on a morning in early June, and yet another one for their
settling on that branch of that tree, and another for their stinging me,
etc., but equally a new and arising category for wasps in general, in-
sects in general, animals in general, flight in general, branches of trees
in general, and so on. There is no more bias here to the specific than
to the general, to ‘nominalism’ more than to ‘realism’. Indeed, without
the reality of the universal at every level, there could be no analogical
harmony or operation of vital ‘plastic principles’ at work, for exam-
ple, in the unifying and then dispersal of food through the process of
digestion.12
It is rather that Herbert has added to an inherited realist outlook a
new modern concern for the particular, and for continuous alteration
without dispersal into monolithic flux. And whether one is speaking of
universal patterns, or of novel instances, the same reconstrual of truth
as arising identity of thing with mind pertains: to know coincides with
the capacity to know, because the latter is a joint product of that which
comes from without, and that which arises from within. It is a work
of emergent coming-together, enabled by the reality of mysterious and
slumbering sympathies throughout all of existence: ‘The relations of
all things are limited by their analogy. Goodness of appearance is the
12 De Veritate, 191.
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emanation of its internal character which becomes explicit through its
analogy with the internal faculties’.13
Herbert’s approach to truth is of a piece with his account of the real
and of intellect. He does not propose criteria for truth, nor a method or
ontological apparatus for locating it. Truth, as for Aquinas, is imme-
diately apparent to the intuitions of rightly functioning mind, although
the application of judgement is more contingent. There is, he says, a
truth of things – of their self-sustaining coherence –, a truth of their
emanations, a truth of concepts, and a truth of intellect. The latter is the
completion of this series, and includes all the other truths. The intellect
will arise variously as the indefinitely many truths, and as the elusive
truth of their unity, when all these truth-events occur in an unimpeded
fashion;14 that is, when the thing can emanate properly, when nothing
impedes one’s vision, when one is in the right situation for observ-
ing and construing things; when one escapes the lures of shadows and
distractions, including those which are generated by one’s own fallen
mind.
Herbert’s emphasis upon intuition, designed to overcome argument
and conflict, in a manner that was not so unlike Descartes, whom Her-
bert read with critical interest,15 does not mean that Herbert found
no place for discursive reasoning. Indeed, De Veritate includes a sec-
tion entitled zetetica, which is, as it were, his own ‘discourse upon
method’.16 Its purpose, however, significantly for the often curative and
medicinal concerns of the Platonic-Hermetic-Scholastic current, over-
lapping with Baconianism, is primarily therapeutic. It was not, as for
Wittgenstein, designed to purge the mind of metaphysical delusion, but
rather to orientate it towards the true, naturally intuited metaphysical
human stance. It is offered as a systematic guide to help one clear away
the occlusions which impede the natural occurrence of truth. It is con-
cerned with purging the means and the medium of understanding, not
directly with things understood, nor with the human understanding in
isolation.
Such things appear, for Herbert, ‘automatically’, as it were, in the
register of a Platonic-Hermetic metaphysics, as continuously intuited
by rightly orientated intelligence. The zetetica offers a complemen-
tary, scholastic and Aristotelian ontology in terms of categorial clas-
sifications: whether a thing is, what its essence is, what qualities and
quantities it possesses, in which relations its stands, what its place and
time may be? However, this inherited ontology is recast in a methodi-
cal, heuristic, and experimental idiom which betokens modern conjec-
tural, philosophical, and natural scientific developments. The critique
13 De Veritate, 83-89.
14 For Descartes and Gassendi’s responses to Herbert, see Bedford, 46-60.
15 De Veritate, 232-288.
16 De Veritate, 247.
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of ‘the Schools’ which is implied in this recasting suggests a view that
their categorial classifications are somewhat too fixed and certain, too
general, and, at the same time, insufficiently aware of the admixture in
known reality, of the metaphysical, physical and artificial.
One can instance this with examples. First, for Herbert the Humanist,
he notes that the Schools failed to divide reality between the natural,
the artificial, and ‘a combination of both’.17 In a passage later cited by
Giambattista Vico, he describes one’s perfectly comprehensive reach
into the works of artifice, as alike to that of a shoemaker, but not to the
wearer of the shoes, who perfectly knows the shoe. As Vico later under-
stands, one applies the same rule of Herbertian facultas to understand
what is meant by this analogy.18 It is not that the shoemaker perfectly
pre-models the shoe in his mind, nor that he grasps the effective result
through observation, when the shoe has been made, but that the man-
ifestation and knowledge of the shoe keep pace with one another in
a to-and-fro of making something from an array of pre-given materi-
als. At the end of the process of making and knowing, the fully-formed
shoe, and the perfected knowledge of the shoe, arise together. The shoe,
and the truth of the shoe coincide, are as one, because the shoe is an
artefact: verum-factum, as Vico will later say; the coincidence of truth
as a transcendental with the made as a transcendental.
Only the creator God has such a knowledge of nature, His creation.
However, in participating in God’s creative knowledge, one’s ‘facul-
tative’ knowledge is tantamount to a part-creation of that which one
knows, into which one obtains a partial insight: a conscientia, though
not a full scientia, as Vico described it, again developing Herbert.
Herbert’s notion of the active and transformative role of human be-
ings is of a piece with his emphasis upon the way in which ontological
classification cannot be separated from the admixture of artifice and
nature in experimentation, artefaction and technology. In this way, one
could suggest that, for Herbert, metaphysics is a continuing work. In
this, he develops new perspectives of dilation, mutability, in-definition
and infinitisation. That such a synthesis wielded a long-term influence
through the late seventeenth-century ‘neo-Renaissance’, exemplified
in Newton and Leibniz, and later, upon eighteenth-century Romantic
thought, and beyond, despite the dominant notion of disechanted mech-
anism, suggests that one cannot dismiss these currents as transitional
or marginal.
17 Giambattista Vico, De Antiquissima Italorum Sapientia: Liber Metaphysicus, Opere
Filosofiche (Florence, Sansoni, 1971), VII and Secnda Risposta III, p. 154 [translated]: ‘man
with every faculty makes the object proper to it […] following Lord Herbert in his book De
Veritate […] for every sensation there unfolds and manifests in us a new faculty’. See John
Milbank, The Religious Dimension in the Thought of Giambattista Vico 1668-1744, Part I:
The Early Metaphysics (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1991), 62-65.
18 De Veritate, 255-258.
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One can also observe this synthesis at work in Herbert’s categori-
sation of humanity in fluid terms. The human being is not, he says,
a ‘rational animal’, as for the tradition; the human being is complex,
does not stay the same, and is not uniquely rational.19 A human being,
it is averred, is somewhat mineral, somewhat vegetable, as when she
sleeps, and somewhat animal. Other animals possess the reason that is
appropriate to their self-preservation, but human beings appear to pos-
sess religion, or the ‘inner sense’ of the existence of divinities, and of
the supreme God. In addition, in the case of human beings, reason is
coterminous with one’s conatus. But what is to be preserved is spirit,
which longs for an eternal preservation, because its range is not con-
fined by finite purpose, while the soul aporetically exceeds itself. This
religious longing for the eternal is specific to human beings, and may
be seen as the ‘last difference’ which defines the human being. Herbert
describes human facultative knowledge as seeking out in every case a
scholastic ‘specific difference’, revealing that his pluralism is not to
be mistaken for nominalistic deconstruction. He considers that, since
laughter is unique to human beings, this must belong to their essence,
and is – contra ‘the schools’ – more than accidental, even in the sense
of an accompanying accident.
Herbert’s reappraisal of classification suggests an attentiveness to
the metamorphosis of things and to the idea that what is fundamental
to them may not be constantly present – as seems to be the case for
animality or reason – but rather, sporadically so, in the same way as
religious ritual observances, and outbreaks of mirth. Herbert also here
suggests that one’s animality and one’s reason are not manifest at all
times. This implies an investigative and experiential approach to meta-
physical docketing, one that is not demarcated from the work of the
natural philosopher, or as we should now say ‘scientist’.
Herbert’s primary and spiritualising ‘Platonic-Hermetic’ meta-
physics, for which the more scholastic zetetica is a clarifying aid, put
forward a division between human ‘internal’ and ‘external’ senses, the
latter referring to the primary location of that which one would today
think of as concerning basic factual truths of a ‘theoretical’ kind.20 In
such cases, although a sympathetic resonance between thing and mind
occurs, in order for truth to arise, nevertheless the truths of things re-
tain an external resistance to internal absorption or subsumption. The
warmth of fire reaches within one, yet one does not burn. The actuality
of conflagration is observed from a safe distance. Similarly, and with
a Stoic hint in Herbert’s Platonism, human ‘troubles’ remain external
to one, because, of itself, the mind lies within the path of the Good,
19 De Veritate, 208-231.
20 De Veritate, 146-207.
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and pursues the good with delight; the delight of a hunter, as Cudworth
later says.21
One’s apprehension of things through the senses and faculties which
retain certain phenomena at a distance, are always enabled by ‘the
internal senses’. One knows that fire burns because one experiences
inwardly its heat and light, and indeed its burning, if one advances
too close, though in such a case, natural harmonies and proprieties are
disturbed.
However, in the case of the internal senses, that which lies properly
outside one, reaches or is drawn within, without alteration, save one
of augmentation or intensification of its inherent properties.22 Light
passes into one. Light is a mediating phenomenon between the mate-
rial and the spiritual, however, and what is apprehended by the internal
senses is more spiritual in character. So beauty remains what it is when
it is outside one, when it is drawn within one, but acquires a more in-
tensive form. The inner senses register the good in things and the right
harmony and order of the whole. Indeed, there is a faculty orientated
towards this whole, in keeping with Herbert’s general scheme. This
same faculty has the sense of the participation of things in God, and
their orientation towards God, which accounts for their conveyance of
an attracting or drawing of beauty. Through the operation of this fac-
ulty, one is gradually ‘conformed’ to God. But the link of this vertical
conformation with the myriad horizontal conformations is so closely
wrought that, for Herbert, where the things of this world are analogi-
cally conformed to each other and to mind, they will be also analogi-
cally conformed to God.
Within this field of the religious-ethical, Herbert speaks of the ‘com-
mon notions’ shared by all of Humanity as to one’s duties towards God
and neighbour.23 Commentators often puzzle over why this is the case;
if these notions are seen as a priori and innate, why does Herbert appeal
to a shared cultural consensus which spans all times and places. But for
Herbert, there is nothing innate to one’s mind, whose form is finished.24
Rather, common notions result from the interaction of one person with
another, and one society with another. Common notions emerge from
the most general modes of conformation, not just between persons and
things, but between persons and persons, and between peoples and peo-
ples. This does not gainsay Herbert’s naïveté concerning cultural dis-
parities and historical variations. But within his philosophical schema,
this would seem to imply the idea that inter-human and inter-cultural
conforming is to be seen as a horizon, a work still to be completed.
21 Ralph Cudworth, A Treatise of Freewill in A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Im-
mutable Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 173.
22 De Veritate, 115-145.
23 De Veritate, 87-89, 120.
24 De Veritate, 332-334.
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Alongside this sense of a receding horizon towards which one
reaches, one must consider Herbert’s hierarchy of certainty. Least cer-
tain is the domain of discursive reason, which he holds responsible
for the violent doctrinal and confessional conflicts of his time. The
problem is not one of religion corrupting reason, but rather the reverse.
Dialectical process can readily go awry; one can fool oneself about a
chain of logical entailments, or fail to see that one’s prejudices have
intervened. As for David Hume, the trouble with any sequence of rea-
soning is that a later judgement must always judge an earlier one, all
the way back to the very beginning. The discursive process is perforce
poorly inaugurated, and its need of supplementary revisions is never se-
cure, and always ceding place to subsequent re-assessment. Truth finds
no secure berth in this ever-moving caravan, unsure of where it comes
from, or to where it might be going.
Herbert’s distrust of institutional religion did not point him back to-
wards detached reason, as it might for a modern agnostic or atheist
thinker, but rather, towards what he took to be natural intuition within a
divinely governed universe. After the lowest uncertainties of discursive
reasoning, under the influence of revived antique scepticism, were the
deliverances of the external senses. But far more certain were those of
the internal senses: one’s sense of beauty, goodness, and of the divine.
In the case of the external senses, it is a matter of the truths in things
seeking to awaken the answering truth of arising faculties. But in the
case of the internal senses, it may be the case that one’s dormant facul-
ties look for things that will realise their longings; perfect human love
and community, for example. It is in the sphere of religion that that
faculty takes the initial lead over object: God is the object of one’s ut-
termost search and desire, but remains unknown and elusive. In either
direction – of things seeking faculties, or faculties seeking things –
Herbert’s metaphysics of sympathy and affinity assumes that no search
can be in vain. One’s searching for God becomes a certain proof not
just of divine existence, but of the beatific vision, the sustained happi-
ness which every mind longs for, and even of divine grace, which he
describes as the ‘specially providential’ reaching down of God towards
personal contact with every spiritual being.
By reason of this hierarchy, Herbert does not first develop his theory
of truth as conformation and then apply it subsequently to aesthetic,
ethical, and religious truths. It is rather the other way around: one
believes in truth as conformation because one has a facultative appre-
ciation of the conformity of each thing with every other thing, all of
these being gradually conformed to the mind of God. For this reason,
the primary truths are religious, aesthetic, ethical, and political, while
theoretical and relatively empirical truths are more uncertain. The
‘common notions’ of the former must guide and assist one’s uncer-
tainties in the latter. Herbert was far from yielding to the temptation to
C© 2020 The Authors. New Blackfriars published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Provincial Council of the English Province of
the Order of Preachers
14 Truth as Conformation in Herbert of Cherbury
take cultural refuge in the certainty of the physical and positive, unlike
some contemporaries, such as Thomas Hobbes.25
By the same token, the highest truth coincides with the Good, and
the lure of the Good takes precedence over the manifest presence of the
True, and so the promptings of an emergent faculty over the seekings of
things for mental apprehension. A spiritualising Platonic-Hermeticism
is here paramount. If Herbert’s later reputation as the ‘father of deism’
is now seen by scholars to be unwarranted, it is the case that he empha-
sised Christian features which he thought, perhaps implausibly, could
be recognised in other faiths, and considered religious institutions and
ceremonies as of secondary importance. Historical revelation, though
certainly confessed, seems to have been little more than a confirmation
of a kind of natural religion, whose shape remains nevertheless over-
whelmingly Christian in character.26 Herbert, conspicuously or not,
says nothing of Christology or the Trinity. And yet his sense of be-
ing as inherently manifest as truth, and of both as drawn forward by
the further horizon of the good, could be interpreted as suggestive of
Trinitarian intimations, of both a Platonic and a Christian kind.
Unlike later variants of Deism, his thought remains marked by a
mystical sensibility which at times recalls Nicholas of Cusa, or an-
ticipates Descartes and Pascal. Like Descartes, he regards human free
will as being in the image of divine infinity, because of its limitless
scope, and he holds that every divine attribute is echoed by a respon-
sive human faculty, while the divine unity is echoed by one’s faculty for
their unification, which is the stamp of a seal of wax in one, coincid-
ing with our unified personality.27 In one’s freedom and the unlimited
scope of one’s understanding, one’s soul seems to exceed itself in such
a way that the soul may expand or contract, while the indefinite num-
ber of one’s faculties is mysteriously unified by one’s consistency of
self-preservation.28 These mysteries of self-exceeding and unifying of
the boundless are eminently true of God. In a manner that again recalls
Cusanus, Herbert invokes the coincidence of opposites, whereby the
boundless and unified infinite in God is the supreme unity:
‘He transcends transcendence, and fills, informs and encompasses the
infinite itself in the vastness of his unity’.29
This paradoxical combination of the self-contained as the self-
exceeding, or, as this quotation suggests, of the uncontained as exceed-
ing this containment towards form, can allow a potentially Trinitarian
25 De Veritate, 289-313.
26 De Veritate, 146-207, 330.
27 De Veritate, 146-207, 330.
28 De Veritate, 330.
29 De Veritate, 330.
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development. Herbert construes the divine paradox as reflected in a
paradoxical ontology of creation:
‘[I]n all that is finite we can find some trace of the infinite. Thus every-
thing seems capable of being divided into an infinity of parts, but since
it must in the end be resolved into a unity (the ultimate characteristic of
the infinite), infinity and unity appear to meet’.
In many ways Herbert’s approach to truth and to knowledge remained
within a current of perennial reflection within which one can also situ-
ate Thomas Aquinas. Truth for this legacy, is fully ontological, fully a
part of reality. If it is most fulfilled within mind, then this also means—
in contrast to modern anti-psychologism after Frege and Husserl—that
truth cannot exist apart from mind. On the one hand, truth is most
supremely a property of thought rather than of things; on the other
hand, truth is simply what most completely occurs when mind is act-
ing naturally, which might include acting under the lure of grace. Truth
is the most complete expression of things which coincides with things
themselves when, as most of all with God, mind possesses the capacity
to bring things about through thinking.
Akin to Aquinas also is Herbert’s refusal of normal faculty psychol-
ogy and insistence that the human person thinks and acts in integral
terms. This includes the point that in neither thinker is reason ever sun-
dered from the will. This unity is bound up with the way in which hu-
man beings are ecologically situated in a circle alongside things, and in
a circulation between God and his creation. Thus Aquinas will some-
times speak of things entering the mind through the intellect, and of the
mind then going out again to things through the will; yet at other times,
he will speak of things first stimulating the will to act from without, and
the intellect then reaching back outwards to things through intention. In
the case of both thinkers, it is this active circularity which requires that
will and intellect be fused as instigating- and teleological- desire, and
that intellect and things be regarded as intrinsically connected under
the auspices of truth.
As we have seen, though, Herbert was able to expand this specifi-
cally ‘enchanted’ negotiation of truth in such a way as to take account
of burgeoning modern sensibilities: of the fluidity of ontological cate-
gories, of the proximity of metaphysics to experimental physics, of the
diverse unrepeatability of things, and of the diversity of perspective. An
enhanced sense of the power of the human mind artificially to trans-
form things was matched by an equal sense of the dynamically vital
and even proto-cognitive mutability of things and their capacity to alter
us. Yet none of these new notes in any way diminished the ultimately
Platonic and participatory framework of Herbert’s reflections. Indeed,
they enhanced it insofar as it becomes still more clear that the only full
truth abides in the eternal, of which we only glimpse passing and al-
tering fragments. Nor is there any diminution of the inherited sense of
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the mysterious affinities that exist between thing and between things
and mind. Indeed, once more observation and experiment seemed to
Herbert and several of his contemporaries rather to confirm this legacy.
Thus we are led, in this case as in so many others, to the suspicion
that what we take for granted as ‘modern’ is in reality a disenchanted
view of reality encouraged not by secularisation in the first instance,
but by a specific type of theology: in this case, one, as for Bacon and
Descartes, which sharply divided the will from the intellect in the sup-
posed name of the absolute power of God, whose unbound liberty is
matched by a reduction of his thought processes to ineluctable logical
sequences. For such an outlook, no thought or vitality can be enshrined
within things, nor can the truth for human minds be a matter of our
ecological connectedness, or of our being drawn through our concourse
with things and converse with other spirits, back to unity with God as
the ultimate fount of all truth and all understanding.
Herbert of Cherbury, then, can be taken as one of many opposite
witnesses to a way not taken, but still open to us: a way to be at once
traditional and modern in our approaches to truth.
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